We examine whether organizations vicariously learn from near-failures and failures of others. We propose that the impact of such failure-related experience depends on the geographic market and industry origin of the experience. Our findings indicate that the local failure-related experience of both banks and thrifts have higher survival-enhancing learning value for banks than nonlocal experience, supporting the value of accessibility and applicability for useful learning. Bank near-failure experience had more value than bank failure experience, but thrift failure and near-failure experience had equivalent impact, suggesting that the learning impact of types of failure-related experience varies with its industry origin.
Researchers increasingly argue that vicariously learning from other organizations' experiences is an important way that organizations acquire knowledge (Ingram & Baum, 1997a; Miner & Haunschild, 1995) . Much empirical work on vicarious learning, however, focuses on the positive replication of routines, strategies, and designs of apparently successful organizations (Burns & Wholey, 1993; Conell & Cohn, 1995; Haunschild & Miner, 1997) . Normative theories and management advice also frequently emphasize finding "best practices" as a means of learning from currently successful oranizations, sometimes through formalized "benchmarking" procedures (Collins & Porras, 1994; Peters & Waterman, 1982) .
An intriguing recent strand of work has begun to explore whether organizations can also learn from the failures of other organizations. Ingram and Baum (1997a) , for example, provided evidence that hotel chains benefited from industry competitive experience reflected in the historical levels of hotel failures. Miner and her colleagues drew on an inductive review of industry histories to describe how other firms' failures served as wake-up calls, encouraging survivors to search for new actions or to devise new business models or routines (Miner, Kim, Holzinger, & Haunschild, 1999) . This line of research is exciting because it broadens the scope of research by exploring different types of experience. It answers calls for interorganizational learning research to tackle impacts above and beyond those linked to cumulative operating experience (Ingram, 2002) . It also underscores the potential value of failure experience and counters the prior emphasis on learning from success (Kim, 2000; McGrath, 1999; Sitkin, 1992) .
Our analysis starts with this emerging research on vicarious learning from failure and advances the organizational learning literature in two important ways. First, we examine the impact of both failure and near-failure, which we defined as occurring when an organization experiences an impending failure but later recovers without actually failing. Prior exploration of vicarious learning from failure has focused almost exclusively on learning from complete failures of other firms (e.g., Chuang & Baum, 2003; Ingram & Baum, 1997a) , and potential learning from other types of failure-related experience has not yet been addressed. Thus, understand-ing of vicarious learning becomes limited to two performance extremes-extreme success and failure-while most organizational experience falls somewhere in the middle. The emerging work in organizational learning has shed new light on this gray area by examining the impact of failure-like events, such as airline near-accidents (Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; Tamuz, 2001 ) and car recalls (Haunschild & Rhee, 2004) , on organizational learning, but these studies have not compared different types of failure-related experience. There is clearly much to understand about whether vicarious learning can occur from other failure-related experience.
In this article, we propose that both failures and near-failures can engender vicarious learning by other firms. Vicarious learning can involve different steps and processes: industry-level failure or near-failure experience can trigger a firm to search for new activities; act as a knowledge source that offers solutions to challenges or displays behaviors to imitate or avoid; and/or provide the opportunity to develop useful theories and strategies (Kim & Miner, 2000; Miner et al., 1999) .
Second, we propose that the context of failurerelated experience influences the impact of vicarious learning activities. Although the organizational learning literature has suggested that the degree of relatedness between organizational groups influences the nature and impact of interorganizational learning (Ingram, 2002) , understanding of how different types of relatedness shape learning outcomes is limited. We directly address this gap in the literature by exploring vicarious learning between different but related clusters of organizations. Specifically, we propose that the geographic market and industry origin of failure and near-failure experience influences whether other organizations can fruitfully learn from this experience. These factors influence the ease of observation, visibility, and applicability of knowledge gained in vicarious learning.
We explored our research questions in the context of the U.S. commercial banking industry over a 15-year period. Following the tradition of organizational learning research that emphasizes learning outcomes (Argote, 1999; March & Sevon, 1988) , we tested our theories using an important organizational outcome-survival. Our approach builds on Baum and Ingram's framework of survival-enhancing learning, which they defined as occurring when "experience leads to a decrease in an organization's risk of failure " (1998: 996) . Survival-enhancing learning can help a firm operate more efficiently (Epple, Argote, & Devadas, 1991; Yelle, 1979) , implement more effective routines or strategies (Virany, Tushman, & Romanelli, 1992) , respond appropriately to competitive threats and opportunities, and/or take action based on better understanding of stakeholder preferences or causal factors in the firm's environment (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Kraatz, 1998) .
Since this is an emerging area of research, we wanted our study to reflect valid evidence about actual learning processes. Accordingly, we informed our formal deductive study with an ongoing qualitative investigation of various sources of learning available to the banks in our study setting, drawing on historical and interview evidence. We grounded our theorizing in a careful assessment of actual vicarious learning processes that occurred in the banking industry during the study period, and we probed the microprocesses involved in learning from different types of failure-related experience. In presenting our hypotheses, we describe or illustrate specific learning processes reported in industry histories or by informants. However, it is important to note that this is not an inductive study. Our qualitative evidence was not used to build theories around a specific industry situation, but rather to inform empirical models that accurately reflected our theories and industry-specific boundary conditions (Eisenhardt, 1989) .
Our findings support the predictions that both industry near-failure and failure experience can generate vicarious survival-enhancing learning. They also confirm that the geographic market and industry origins of industry-level near-failure and failure experiences influence learning outcomes. This study's primary contributions to the literature on organizational learning are threefold: first, the development of expanded theory on vicarious learning from failure-related experience; next, the presentation of the first study of learning from nearfailure experience; and third, the explicit consideration of different types of failure-related experience and their relative impacts on learning outcomes. Our findings extend theories of organizational learning by illuminating the potentially powerful impact of learning from both industry-level failures and near-failures. Finally, this study intimates the potential benefit of further research on interorganizational learning as a way to study change in populations, markets, and industries in ecologies of learning (Baum & Ingram, 1998; Miner & Haunschild, 1995) .
RESEARCH SETTING
The U.S. commercial banking industry offered fertile ground for probing our research questions. Starting from the early 1980s, a number of factors injected greater instability into the once-static commercial banking industry. A series of deregulations allowed other types of financial service firmsincluding thrifts, credit unions, and security and insurance firms-to expand into areas once exclusively reserved for commercial banks, thus eroding the traditional customer base of banks (Berger, Kashyap, & Scalise, 1995) . To counter this increased competition, banks began to add elements from previously unexplored domains to their traditional business mix, including risky commercial real estate development. The commercial banking industry experienced dramatic turmoil as a result of these changes. During the period, a large number of banks failed; many others suffered severe financial distress and narrowly escaped failure (Gupta & Misra, 1999; Holland, 1993) . This epidemic of failures heightened awareness among surviving banks and prompted them to actively seek lessons from these failures and near-failures in hopes of improving their own survival chances (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation [FDIC], 1997) . Federal and state regulators also paid greater attention to analyzing failing banks and strategies that appeared to revive failing banks, and they disseminated preventive measures in varied ways (FDIC, 1998) . Thus, this setting provided an exceptional opportunity for examining whether firms learned from this industrywide failure-related experience.
This industry offers several important benefits for investigating our specific research questions. The U.S. commercial banking industry includes three distinctive subpopulations: commercial banks, thrifts (i.e., savings and loans [S&Ls] and savings banks), and credit unions.
1 Because these subpopulations are distinct but related, the industry provides a rare opportunity to examine interpopulation learning. We focused on learning between the two subpopulations of banks and thrifts. Historically, these institutions fulfilled different market needs; banks emerged to serve small businesses, and thrifts were conceived to serve consumers (Haveman & Rao, 1997) . Although deregulations in the 1980s and 1990s eliminated some of the differences between banks and thrifts, substantial differences remain. Because their core features are largely intact, they are governed by distinct regulatory bodies, subject to different regulatory rules, use different business models, possess different types of capabilities, and exploit different niches in terms of providing value (Kaufman & Kormendi, 1986) .
2 At the same time, there are enough similarities to make it possible for them to learn from each other. Because their markets partially overlap, they monitor each other's strategies and practices. Frequent communications and personnel exchanges between firms in the two populations provide them with ample opportunities to share lessons with one another. Further, there are sufficient commonalities in their operating principles, so lessons drawn from each other are relevant and applicable (FDIC, 1998) . In our interviews with bankers, many reported that they believed banks and thrifts differed substantially in resource and market requirements, but that they actively monitored the fates of thrifts, especially in the study period.
In addition, the availability of performance ratings that are standardized across banks and thrifts provides an objective and comprehensive measure of near-failure experience, a key focus of our study. Also, commercial banks are a relatively homogeneous group in their basic operations, which eliminates many potential causes of model specification bias and reduces the danger of unobserved firmlevel heterogeneity. Finally, our field data and industry histories revealed the existence of multiple layers of communication channels through which individual banks could learn vicariously, including regulators, affinity groups, league consultants, associations, and personal networks (White, 1991) . Biographies of industry participants showed professional links and memberships in banking communities, sometimes reaching over generations (FDIC, 1998) . Thus, firms could plausibly learn vicariously from others' failure-related experiences indirectly, via the channels that existed in this industry, as well as more directly.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Survival-Enhancing Learning from Industry Near-Failure Experience
Learning from near-failures of other banks. We define one important variation of failure-related experience, near-failure, as occurring when a firm experiences impending failure but later recovers.
Theories of organizational learning imply that industry near-failure experience (the number of firms that have almost failed) has important attributes that make it a valuable source of vicarious learning (Baum & Ingram, 1998; Lant & Mezias, 1990; Miner et al., 1999) .
One important advantage of near-failure experience from the learning perspective is that it is composed of rich, complex information embedded in a cumulative set of events. This view is not consistent with the traditional learning perspective emphasizing organizations' inability to learn from complexity (Cyert & March, 1963) . According to this view, decision makers prefer simple and clear information as a source of learning because limited cognitive capabilities make them unable to evaluate all available information. However, emerging evidence increasingly emphasizes the value of complexity in organizational learning. For example, Haunschild and her colleagues found evidence that firms can learn more effectively from complex, heterogeneous experience than from simple experience (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002) . At the individual level, Morris and Moore (2000) similarly reported that counterfactual information enhances the effectiveness of learning.
A large number of near-failures in an industry provide firms with many opportunities to observe others' descent toward failure, indicating conditions that can threaten their own survival (Miner et al., 1999) . The accumulated experience of those who managed to recover from impending failure offers additional valuable information, including a set of potential solutions. This combination offers contrasting information that clarifies a causal relationship and removes a great deal of uncertainty from the cause-outcome relationship in the observed near-failure events (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002) . In essence, near-failures provide a series of pre-post experiments in which one set of conditions generates near-death, and another creates a reversal of fortune. Using a medical analogy, Kim (2000) suggested that learning from firms that nearly failed but managed to recover provides a rich description of both "symptoms and germs" (what happened) and "a working cure" (a proven solution).
The classic learning literature suggests that firms rarely state a problem and then select a course of action that can solve the problem (March, 1981; Starbuck & Hedberg, 1977) , in spite of theory that casts them as rational problem solvers (Simon, 1979) . Instead, firms often create potential actions or routines unrelated to current problems and then call on these preconstructed actions when problems arise (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972; Feldman, 1986) . This practice makes near-failure experience an attractive source of vicarious learning because it provides proven templates that an organization can use to solve similar problems that it may face in the future. Returning to the medical analogy, although the symptoms of failure and the germ that caused it may be interesting and educational, managers are primarily interested in finding a working cure and adopting it. In this regard, near-failure experience is more likely to provide lessons to be adopted by observing firms than other types of failure-related experience that do not provide proven solutions.
Our qualitative investigation provided evidence consistent with these arguments about the special value of the near-failures of other banks. For example, in the early 1980s, 23 percent of the FDICinsured banks in the FDIC Northeastern Region were considered problem institutions at risk of failure. These banks had aggressively expanded into large commercial loans and commercial real estate development-business areas in which they had little experience-to take advantage of deregulation. Many of these banks, including the five largest banks in New Hampshire, eventually failed, but others managed to turn around, either by diversifying loan portfolios and writing off nonperforming loans to improve their capital quality or by merging with other, financially healthy banks. Banks in the southern states adopted these practices when a crisis caused by similar problems hit that region (FDIC, 1997) . In an interview conducted for this study, a California bank executive commented: 3 The news that [a bank] is in trouble does not interest me much. For example, a bank in our district is struggling because its asset quality has gone down a lot over the past couple of years. FDIC is scrutinizing the bank, and will probably put it under their receivership. It is an interesting story to talk about, but there is not much we can learn from it. But, if I hear they emerge victorious, I will be very interested in knowing how they came out it. That kind of information can be extremely valuable for our own strategy. Finding out why is easy, but the difficult part of our job is to figure out how.
Near-failure may also serve as an especially powerful trigger for vicarious learning because firms that overcome near-failure are sometimes proud of their success and are thus more inclined to discuss it. The literature on attribution demonstrates firms' tendencies to credit organization members for success, even when it could be more objectively attributed to external factors (e.g., Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985) . Because favorable attribution is a source of managerial pride and organizational prestige (D' Aveni, 1990) , managers are motivated to broadcast their successful recovery stories to others. Thus, lessons learned from near-failures may disseminate quickly, resulting in rapid proliferation of apparently valuable actions and strategies, or an emergence of new mixes of practices in an industry. A senior midwestern bank manager provided a supporting observation:
Some of the most active discussion participants at this [banking] conference are managers from oncetroubled banks. They really enjoy talking about how they saved their banks. It seems it gives them some bragging rights. Of course, you should give them a credit because it is not an easy task, and listening to their stories is often very educational.
In sum, through a variety of processes industry near-failure experience can produce survival-enhancing learning. Thus, our first hypothesis is: Hypothesis 1. The higher the level of bank industry near-failure experience, the lower the bank failure rate.
Learning from near-failures of thrifts. Firms can improve their viability by learning from firms in other industries (Aldrich, 1999) , although evidence for this possibility remains scarce. For example, Brittain and Wholey (1988) found that different electronic component manufacturers observed and learned strategies and technologies from firms in other populations. In their study of the U.S. radio industry, Leblebici and his colleagues (Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, & King, 1991) richly described the process and unintended consequences of how national radio networks learned from television networks and competing local radio stations. Although little systematic quantitative evidence directly shows interpopulation learning, a considerable body of historical and qualitative research describes the migration of organizational practices and strategies across countries and, in some cases, across industries (e.g., Kogut & Zander, 1993) . A managerial literature and the popular press describe benchmarking norms that specifically encourage interpopulation learning. Firms are urged to study the best practices of firms in other industries (Collins & Porras, 1994; Peters & Waterman, 1982) , in part because it is assumed that such noncompetitors will be more willing to share information. Observers often point to examples such as Motorola's success in its Bandit project in the 1980s, which has been attributed to Motorola's practice of looking for benchmarks in firms in apparently unrelated industries-firms such as Benetton and Wal-Mart (Smith, 1993) .
Some evidence shows that the degree to which industries scan and look to other industries for insight and practice varies. Where interpopulation competition is strong, competitive advantage can arise from complex strategic interactions with firms in competing industries as well as from those with others in the same industry. In his study of the early telephone industry in Pennsylvania and Iowa, for example, Barnett (1990) found evidence that the viability of telephone companies depended not only on their membership in a specific technology group but also on interaction with other, competing technology groups. Thus, firms monitor and benchmark the strategies of other firms in competing industries if they believe their performance and viability depend on the actions of those firms. A tendency to overlook the existence or relevance of firms not in the same industry may hamper such interpopulation learning; firms may either narrowly define who is in their industry or underestimate the potential relevance of experience garnered by firms not directly producing the same products (Christensen, 1997; Porac, Thomas, Wilson, Paton, & Kanfer, 1995) .
Research on interpopulation learning, like research on intrapopulation learning, emphasizes imitation of positive practices and attention to apparently successful firms or industries. Yet both near-failure and failure in competing industries may indicate new threats common to multiple industries and offer opportunities for understanding the consequences of particular organizational actions.
Research on banking provides ample evidence that banks and thrifts have actively monitored each other's performance and strategies. For example, Brewer and Jackson (2002) found that financial distress announcements of banks affected the behavior of other types of financial service firms. The series of deregulations implemented during the 1980s elevated the market contact between banks and thrifts, consequently increasing banks' effort to monitor thrifts' business practices (FDIC, 1997) . Our field data also suggested that, in the period of our study, banks began to see thrifts as relevant to their operation and competitiveness and to import professionals or practices from thrifts. An executive at a regional California bank reported that, after his bank got into trouble with real estate investments, it began collecting information about thrifts that had experienced similar problems during the well-publicized S&L crisis, and his bank then imitated actions taken by the surviving thrifts. Using that experience, in his words, "was a real life-saver." Hypothesis 2. The higher the level of thrift industry near-failure experience, the lower the bank failure rate.
Survival-Enhancing Learning from Industry Failure Experience
Learning from failures of other banks. Firms that completely fail presumably have no opportunity to learn from their own failures. However, their demises provide other firms in their industry with a valuable opportunity to observe and learn and thus improve their chances of survival by avoiding strategies and actions taken by the failed firms (Haunschild & Miner, 1997; Levinthal & March, 1993) . Observing failures of others can also prompt firms to evaluate the contexts of these failures and to determine whether they might be subject to a similar fate. Firms can then take steps to resist potential threats or develop new strategies (Miner et al., 1999) . Supporting these arguments, emerging evidence has begun to suggest that the extent to which failure occurs in a given industry entails the competitive challenges of the industry and that firms can learn vicariously from failure experience generated by other firms (Chuang & Baum, 2003; Ingram & Baum, 1997a) .
It is possible that this type of learning may simply lead to blind imitation of perceived survivors, rather than a deliberate effort to construct causal theories about how to thrive. A more fruitful way in which an observing firm may learn to improve its survival odds is for it to draw inferences from the failures of other firms in its industry, which can produce an understanding of causal processes that can guide future actions (Sitkin, 1992) . This form of learning involves changes that go beyond the simple rejection of inefficient organizational forms or strategies. Firms may generate novel causal models that permit them to create new organizational forms, practices, or strategies not currently available in their industry (Kim, 2000) . One way to conceptualize the potential value of prior failures is to take the viewpoint of an industry as a whole and think of each firm's fate as a natural experiment, each providing its industry with information for many different types of learning, ranging from simple trial-and-error to nuanced interpretation that leads in turn to knowledge creation. Thus, the cumulative number of such experiments captures the number of such learning opportunities. An industry expert shared a similar view with us:
In the banking industry, accountability is of prime importance because bank failure is very costly to everybody. Bank closures are definitely a public good filled with useful information, and give you a chance to check your reality. Regulators also make sure that bank failure is well-publicized and widely communicated to warn other banks.
Perhaps surprisingly, some learning theories imply that learning from others' failures may be even more valuable than trying to learn from others' successes (Sitkin, 1992) . When firms learn about another's success, they may face a higher temptation to simply imitate blindly. Replicating exact strategies of successful firms without tailoring them to one's own firm may be perceived as safe, but this simple imitation may not be effective because outcomes can depend on the context in which an organization operates (Greve, 1999) . Further, the same routines or strategies that worked for a first learner may not work for a subsequent learner in ecologies of competition and learning (Barnett & Hansen, 1996) . In contrast to these potential limitations of learning from success, firms learning from others' failure may be more likely to engage in search activities and to actively interpret their observations (Sitkin, 1992) . Consequently, failure by others can stimulate firms to find a differentiated way to apply the insights and lessons drawn from their observations.
Prior banking studies and our own field data provide qualitative evidence that industry-level failure experience can generate survival-enhancing learning and induce different reactions from observing banks. Some banks may reduce business risk by avoiding or decreasing their dependence on strategies perceived to have caused the observed failures. For example, the operating strategy of MCorp, the second largest banking entity in Texas, was focused heavily on oil, agriculture, and commercial real estate development. When the recession in these sectors began to hit Texas in the late 1980s, MCorp had to face a sharp increase in nonperforming assets and loan charge-offs, which eventually led them to failure in 1989. This wellpublicized failure prompted other banks with similar business profiles to reevaluate their operating strategies and implement others that could prevent a similar fate (FDIC, 1998) . Some banks actively sought ways to improve operating efficiency or reduce costs, to counter potential losses due to problems similar to those experienced by the failed bank. Others responded by diversifying their business portfolios to spread risk or by expanding into complementary geographic markets.
Taken together, these arguments suggest that industry failure experience can provide vicarious learning opportunities for surviving banks, which we expect to see reflected in a reduced failure rate for observing banks:
Hypothesis 3. The higher the level of bank industry failure experience, the lower the bank failure rate.
Learning from failure experience among thrifts. Prior studies that recognized the failures or accidents of others as a source of vicarious learning have typically focused on single-industry experience (Chuang & Baum, 2003; Haunschild & Rhee, 2004; Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; Ingram & Baum, 1997a ). An important learning advantage of failure is that it is often highly publicized and may be salient and observable to a broad audience, including firms outside the industry in which the failure event occurred. Thus, failure has a strong potential to stimulate the learning efforts of firms in a different industry. These learning efforts are more likely to arise and generate useful knowledge when firms in the two industries have market contact and/or are related on key operational dimensions. Failure in a related industry may signal impending dangers or trends that will affect a firm's own industry and stimulate search for ways to avoid a similar fate, and it may offer information about coming trends or threats (Miner et al., 1999) .
The banking literature has documented that the rampant failure of thrifts during the S&L crisis acted as a wake-up call to banks and, in some instances, stimulated learning about specific practices (Brewer & Jackson, 2002) . To seize the opportunity presented by deregulation, many thrifts rushed into new business domains, most notably commercial real estate lending and investment. Their inexperience with business practices outside of their traditional single-mortgage lending and hasty expansion to these new business opportunities led many of them to adopt poor business practices, such as borrowing short-term capital to finance long-term lending. This mismatch made them vulnerable to interest rate fluctuation and eventually resulted in the S&L crisis (Holland, 1993; White, 1991) . The banking industry paid attention to activities that unfolded during the period of many failures of thrifts, and the lessons drawn from this observation helped banks and regulators contain bank failure during the subsequent banking crisis (FDIC, 1997 (FDIC, , 1998 . Our informants also routinely reported that lessons drawn from the S&L crisis informed actions by banks and reduced their own danger of failure. 
The Relative Value of Experience in the Same and Different Geographic Markets
Research in organizational learning has long suggested that vicarious learning efforts often focus on outcomes occurring spatially close to focal actions and that firms mainly use other, similar firms as "learning targets" (Levinthal & March, 1993; Levitt & March, 1988) . Students of neoinstitutional theory also emphasize the tendency of firms to imitate the practices and routines of others that are close to themselves on key organizational dimensions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1991) . Considerable evidence supports the argument that firms are more likely to try to learn from similar others than from dissimilar others (Greve, 1999; Haunschild & Miner, 1997) . For example, Fligstein (1991) found that firms tend to follow the diversification strategies of other firms in the same field. Haveman (1993), Burns and Wholey (1993) , and Haunschild and Miner (1997) reported similar results.
Because managers are not capable of evaluating all possible alternative external learning sources, identifying an optimal learning target in a complex, dynamic environment is not always feasible; thus, they frequently resort to making similar firms their learning targets to minimize the uncertainties associated with vicarious learning (Mezias & Lant, 1994) . One of the dimensions most frequently used to identify a viable learning target is competitive boundary. Managers define competitive boundaries by identifying core strategic features, such as overlap in geographic markets, commonality in product categories, and relative distance in a technology space, which in turn influence information flows and learning strategies (Porac, Thomas, & BadenFuller, 1989) . Since managers see the strategies and actions of their competitors as more relevant to their own performance than the strategies and actions of noncompetitors, they are likely to allocate greater monitoring efforts to their competitors. Further, their frequent market contacts with the competitors offer opportunities to observe the latter's actions and their consequences. In sum, because firms are likely to set up their competitors as primary learning targets, they are more likely to learn from competitors (Greve, 1999) .
In the commercial banking industry, competition is generally considered to be local, as most banksexcept for a few large ones-compete mainly with others in the same geographic market. The banking literature and our qualitative evidence suggest that banks allocate large portions of their monitoring efforts to other banks in the same market because the strategic moves of same-market competitors significantly influence the banks' own competitiveness (Kane, 1996) . A southern California banker shared an experience that exemplified the intensity of monitoring among banks in the same geographic market, describing how local competitors often matched new financial products his bank introduced in a matter of days. In addition, the extra communication layers that exist in a geographic market, such as regional regulators and local associations, facilitate active knowledge sharing. These factors imply that banks have many opportunities to observe other banks in the same market and are consequently more likely to learn from them.
Turning to the issue of value, we argue that lessons learned from outside a firm's focal market may provide limited value to the firm, as the usefulness of such lessons is contingent on the customers and competitors in the focal market (Greve, 1999) . The uncertainty introduced by differences in markets, customers, and suppliers may complicate learning processes and limit applicability (March, Sproull, & Tamuz, 1991) . If banks cannot effectively select and transfer routines, practices, and strategies that can help them in their target market, the out-ofmarket experience may even adversely affect their performance (Ingram & Baum, 1997b) . In his study of radio stations, Greve (1999) provided supporting evidence that employing the experience of stations in other markets can have a negative effect on the performance of the stations.
Although lessons a firm learns from out-of-market experience may have some value in the market in which the firm operates, implementing such lessons may also be more difficult than implementing lessons learned from its own market. The complexity involved in lessons learned from out-of-market experience and resulting difficulties in observing, interpreting, and applying such lessons may impede their effective implementation (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998; Tushman & Nadler, 1978) . In keeping with these arguments, our qualitative evidence suggested that banks were more interested in competitors in their own geographic markets and that bankers generally believed that geographic distance limited the effectiveness of strategies. An executive of a West Coast regional bank noted this:
Before I joined the current bank ten years ago, I used to work for a bank in New York. I was confident that I could adapt right away. What I didn't know was how much difference 3,000 miles can make. I had to relearn many things because there was a significant difference in customers, the economy, and what not.
Even the politics at the regulatory office was different.
These observations imply that, all else being equal, the learning value of both near-failure and failure experience in both industry segments of interest here (banks and thrifts) is greater when the experience has occurred in a bank's own geographical market. The above arguments lead us to a set of four hypotheses: 
The Relative Value of Intrapopulation and Interpopulation Learning
Theories of vicarious learning emphasize the importance of two distinct learning process factors: (1) the visibility of an external event (Ingram, 2002; Ocasio, 1997) and (2) the amount and quality of the information embedded in the event (Argote & Ophir, 2002; Levinthal & March, 1993) . Some qualitative evidence implies fruitful vicarious learning may not take place unless both of these factors are present (Miner et al., 1999; Rerup, 2002) . We propose the balance of these two factors differs when banks learn from banking industry experience versus thrift industry experience and that this balance determines the relative impacts of near-failure and failure experience on survival-enhancing learning.
Visibility of events. Visibility is an important factor that facilitates vicarious learning: deliberate vicarious learning does not occur unless an eventeven if it is full of valuable knowledge-is noticed by potential learners. Firms are more likely to become aware of highly visible events, and conse-quently able to deliberately learn from them (Ocasio, 1997). For example, in his study of the Scandinavian ferry industry, Rerup (2002) reported that vicarious learning did not take place until a highly visible event (a tragic accident that resulted in a large number of casualties) prompted the ferry operators to investigate the cause of the accident and to implement preventive measures. This perspective underscores the advantages of failure as a learning trigger because the failure of a firm is usually a conspicuous, highly publicized event. On the other hand, near-failures are not as visible as failures because they are not widely publicized. We noted above how recovered firms may actively describe their turnarounds as a useful source of knowledge. However, these firms may only share information long after the crisis is past or else may provide self-serving accounts of near-failure (Sutton & Callahan, 1987) . Further, some firms may try to mask their experience when threatened in order to create an impression of ongoing robust health (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; Staw, McKechnie, & Puffer, 1983) . Taken together, these arguments suggest that firms are more likely to observe failures than near-failures and that thus failures can have broader impact.
Information amount and quality. A contrasting approach to assessing the relative value of nearfailure and failure concerns the amount and quality of information embedded in these events. To extract value from external events, firms must convert their observations into actions and interpretations. The quality and completeness of the experience observed determine the value of such interpretation (Haunschild & Ni, 2001; March et al., 1991) . Near-failures generally provide more comprehensive information than failures for two reasons.
First, as we have described, near-failures not only offer information about conditions leading to the threat of failure, but also produce possible solutions to the threats, which could make near-failure a more effective source of learning than failure (Kim, 2000; Rerup, 2002) . By observing failures of others, a firm can learn what caused the businesses' demises but cannot directly learn how to prevent its own demise. Exposure to information signifying only the causes and symptoms of a problem produces an insufficient information base for formulating solutions to the problem. Learning from selfderived conclusions of observed failure provides hypothetical but untried solutions and may lead firms to make superstitious associations among the conditions surrounding observed failures (Huber, 1991) . In contrast, the near-failures of others offer observing firms an opportunity to engage in outcome-based learning (Haunschild & Miner, 1997) .
They can imitate actions that appeared to produce good results, avoid actions that appeared to produce negative results, and develop novel activities based on their interpretations of the observed experiences (Levitt & March, 1988; Miner & Haunschild, 1995) .
Second, failed firms are permanently removed from an industry, along with potentially valuable information associated with their failures, consequently making it difficult for others to learn from the failures (Huber, 1991; Levinthal & March, 1993; Tamuz, 1987) . In contrast, nearly failed firms are not removed from the industry, which permits closer observation of their actions both before and after their near-failure periods. Denrell (2003) similarly argued that organizations tend to undersample failure in vicarious learning because failed organizations are unavailable for observation, which may lead to a variety of false beliefs about effective management.
In sum, theories that stress limited organizational attention or the importance of visibility suggest that failure experience is a better source of vicarious learning. In contrast, theories emphasizing the importance of rich, comprehensive information suggest that near-failure experience has greater survival-enhancing learning effects. Thus, the relative impacts of near-failure and failure experience should be determined by the subtle balance between these two factors. This balance, in turn, is influenced by the industry in which the experience occurs.
Specifically, we suggest that visibility should dominate in interpopulation learning, making failure experience more important than near-failure experience. As noted previously, banks generally consider thrifts to be less important competitors than other banks and thus do not pay as much attention to events involving thrifts. Because failures tend to draw the attention of broader audience, they are more likely to generate visibility and stimulate awareness, even in an interpopulation setting, in which the visibility of events is reduced. This is especially important because there are relatively few formal channels and networks linking banks to the cumulative experience of thrifts. As one bank analyst commented:
It is clear, at least in my mind, banks and thrifts can and do learn from each other. The infamous S&L crisis was clearly a good example. The S&L crisis had a fundamental impact on how banks responded to their own problems that happened around the same time. Many of them failed with different reasons, so I am not sure about how much knowledge was actually shared. But there is no denying that the shockwave of the S&L crisis alerted the financial community, and made banks revise their strategies.
In addition, even if banks have had an opportunity to observe near-failures of thrifts, the different industry contexts may make the subtle lessons conveyed by the events less useful for banks (Argote, 1999; Greve, 1999) . Thus, we contend that failure experience is the more valuable source of survivalenhancing learning when banks learn from thrifts.
In contrast, for intrapopulation learning, the visibility of an event is less of an issue. Banks monitor other banks more closely than they do thrifts because banks have more frequent market contacts and compete more directly with other banks. Thus, the strategies and actions of other banks have more important implications for their own performance. Banks also have more layers of communication channels, including affinity groups, league consultants, and multiple regulators; these channels promote knowledge transfer and ensure information flow (DeLong & DeYoung, 2004) . If learners can easily observe an event because it takes place in the same population, visibility should not affect learning outcomes as much as the quality or usefulness of information embedded in the event. We predict, then, that near-failure experience is more influential than failure experience when banks learn from other banks.
These ideas imply that when learning occurs within the banking industry, near-failure experience should have more survival-enhancing learning impact than failure experience. In contrast, when learning occurs outside the banking industry, failure experience should have more survival-enhancing learning impact than near-failure experience, suggesting the following set of hypotheses: 
METHODS
Qualitative Study
Our study combines exploratory qualitative work with quantitative hypothesis testing to establish a strong link between our theories and our statistical models. Our formal hypotheses test causal predictions about how industry-level experience-that is, observable collective experience at the industry level-impacts organizational survival, which is a form of learning outcome. But our empirical models do not directly examine the intermediate processes that produce the hypothesized relationship. Research in organizational learning has adopted a similar modeling approach (e.g., Yelle, 1979) , owing to the complexity associated with directly measuring learning mechanisms. This approach has been often criticized for leaving a gap in the proposed theories because it does not address how learning occurs (Ingram, 2002) . To guard against overly abstract or unrealistic work, and to fill potential gaps between our theories and our empirical models, we informed and challenged our theorizing via continuous, iterative, qualitative investigations. We used the qualitative evidence to illustrate and corroborate the existence of theorized learning processes. These qualitative data, grounded in field observation, add an important element of feasibility to the theoretical predictions and implications.
We probed potential information sources and learning processes in this industry using several approaches. We conducted formal interviews with three groups of bankers (four to six participants per group) who participated in an executive education program held at a university; we also had continuing interaction with 11 senior-level managers and executives from eight U.S. commercial banks and with six industry experts over a five-year period. The industry experts included researchers at federally funded agencies and analysts from private banking research institutions and financial data management firms. Interview duration varied from 30 minutes to three hours. We also reviewed industry reports, such as those produced by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Reserve Bank (FRB), and the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), that described specific industry issues, remedies, and actors for the study period (FDIC, 1998) . We emphasize here findings from different sources where the data agreed; our evidence includes descriptions of concrete behaviors. This method also helped us to check the validity of the assumptions embedded in our models, to incorporate industry-specific boundary conditions or shared assumptions into our theories, and to interpret our empirical results.
Sample
To test our hypotheses, we used a sample of all the FDIC-insured commercial banks chartered from January 1, 1984, through December 31, 1998. Because over 98 percent of all U.S. banks were insured by the FDIC as of October 1, 1998, this sample closely represents all the banks chartered during the 15 years under study. During the study period, 2,724 banks were chartered, but 28 banks were dropped from the sample because of incomplete data. Thus, the final sample contained quarterly data on 2,696 banks over the 60 quarters. 4 Among the 2,696 banks, 259 failed, and 905 were merged with another bank without FDIC financial assistance. The remaining 1,560 banks were active at the end of the study period.
We used a cohort sample of banks instead of a sample of all banks that existed during the study period because of the historical data constraint. The correct measure of industry near-failure experience for any bank must account for all the nearfailure events that the bank's managers could observe since it was founded. However, given the unavailability of data required to measure nearfailure events before 1984, we could not completely assess this variable for banks founded before 1984. Thus, including all banks in the sample would have resulted in underestimation of the near-failure experience of banks founded before 1984 (Guo, 1993) . The cohort design eliminated this potential source of estimation bias by allowing an accurate specification of key measures for all the banks included in the sample.
The cohort design, however, could limit generalizability of our findings to all the banks that existed during the study period. To assess whether the use of this cohort design threatened our study by introducing any sampling bias, we estimated the models using a sample of all banks in existence during the study period (with a "left-censoring" indicator) and examined whether the results obtained from our cohort sample differed from results obtained from the sample of all banks. The results from the allbanks sample generally mirrored the results from the cohort sample, implying that there was little difference between them.
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The primary financial and demographic data were obtained from IDC Financial Publishing, a leading publisher of data on financial institutions. Data from the FDIC and the FRB provided additional historical statistics and demographic information. Although we chose a cohort study design, data were collected for all 18,379 U.S. commercial banks in existence during the study period because experience variables should be measured using data on all institutions in existence during a period; banks in the sample could learn from banks that were not in the sample (i.e., banks founded before 1984) as well as from other cohort banks in the sample.
Since this study also explored interpopulation competition and learning, we collected key financial and demographic data on all 4,981 thrifts-the major population of competing institutions-in existence during the study period and included them in the analyses. Basic data on credit unions (e.g., density) were also collected and included in the analyses to control for potential effects from the competitive interaction between the first two populations.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable was the unobserved hazard rate for bank failure in the population of commercial banks chartered since 1984. Banks were considered to have failed if they were (1) liquidated or (2) merged with another bank with FDIC assistance. When a bank faces impending failure as a result of financial or managerial problems, the regulators at FDIC search for a potential acquirer for it to avoid costly bank liquidation, and they often financially assist the failing bank to make it a viable merger target. Thus, banks merged with FDIC assistance were considered to be failures although they were not officially liquidated. Mergers and acquisitions not associated with a bank failure were treated as right-censored because events other than the event of interest (i.e., failure) took the subjects out of the risk set. This right censoring did not cause any estimation problem because voluntary mergers and acquisitions occurred independently of the hazard rate of failure (Yamaguchi, 1991) .
Bank failure rate measures a special type of learning outcome and has been frequently used in empirical studies on organizational learning (e.g., Baum & Ingram, 1998; Baum, Li, & Usher, 2000; Ingram & Baum, 1997a) . Because learning may or may not provide value, defining learning by any fixed outcome could lead to an overly narrow representation of organizational learning (Miner & Mezias, 1996) . In addition, failure-like other outcome measures of learning-does not directly capture the specific lessons that emerge from learning or the intermediate processes that operate together to produce survival-enhancing learning. Thus, by us-ing failure rate as the dependent variable, we tested the collective importance rather than the relative impact of each individual lesson or process (Baum & Ingram, 1998) .
Bank failure rate is an appropriate measure of learning outcomes in the context of survival-enhancing learning from failure-related experience for two reasons. First, observers of failure-related experience do not necessarily seek to improve their operating performance since the value of the lessons derived often lies in learning how to avoid a similar fate rather than learning how to achieve superior operating or financial performance. Indeed, the banking literature dedicated to the causes and implications of the collective experience of the banking industry focuses on lessons that pertain to reducing failures of surviving banks (e.g., FDIC, 1997 FDIC, , 1998 . Second, strategies for avoiding failure do not necessarily coincide with strategies for improving operating performance, and implementing failure-avoiding strategies may even lead to lower operating performance. For example, a large number of Texas banks failed in the late 1980s because of their heavy involvement with speculative commercial real estate investment. The observers of these events began to divest their commercial real estate holdings and increase their lending standards for commercial properties. These practices not only lowered their risk of failure, but also their profitability (FDIC, 1998) .
Independent Variables
Defining geographic market. We defined the geographic market of a bank as the state in which its headquarters were located. Specifically, failures and near-failures experienced by other banks in the same state in which a focal bank was located were defined as in-state experience for the focal bank, and those that occurred outside the state were defined as out-of-state experience.
Prior banking studies have defined a bank's market using different geographic units, such as state, metropolitan statistical area, county, and regulatory district (e.g., Berger & DeYoung, 2001 ). In our study setting, state proved the most appropriate definition of geographic market for several reasons. First, the states have been most commonly used to define banks' geographic boundaries of operation because state and federal regulators barred most banks from operating over state borders until the late 1990s (Kane, 1996) . 6 Further, the banks in our sample were all new, relatively small banks that operated primarily in the states in which their headquarters were located. We also analyzed the market shares of banks in our sample using a detailed branch market share database acquired from SNL Financial Inc. and found that the majority of banks in our sample only operated in a single state each. For example, in 1993 approximately 93 percent of all the assets of the banks in the sample were deployed within single states. Thus, defining geographic market by state represented the most objective and systematic method. For consistency with this variable, we also measured most of the control variables in the study at the state level. Second, because we argue that banks are more likely to observe and learn from competitors, the definition of geographic market needed to reflect the boundary of competition. Although some large banks compete in multiple states, a large portion of banks operate primarily in a single state. In particular, since the typical bank in our sample operated predominantly in a single state, it was likely to compete mainly with others in the same state. Although it is possible that banks located close to a state border might compete with others across the border for customers, this situation was likely limited to only a small subset of banks in the sample. Thus, measuring geographic market as state should have properly captured the competitive dynamics of most banks in the sample.
Third, the definition of the geographic market should embrace the boundaries of information flow and learning mechanisms that may determine learning outcomes. Regulators constitute an important source of interorganizational learning because they observe the routines and practices of the banks they supervise and disseminate the lessons acquired from their supervisory activities, which could systematically influence the mix of routines and practices in the market. Approximately 70 percent of the banks in the sample were state-chartered, and their primary regulators were state banking supervisory boards. Thus, state was preferred to alternative regulatory boundaries such as FDIC or FRB district.
Experience discounting. Research in organizational learning suggests that learning from prior experience may not increase indefinitely with amount of experience because the value of experience depreciates over time, as the conditions under which the experience was acquired change (Argote, 1999) . The benefits of learning from distant past experiences may lead firms to adopt outdated routines and even harm their performance by prompting them to replicate strategies that worked well in the past but have only limited value in a current environment (Levinthal & March, 1993) . Our qualitative study also suggested that professionals believed that the value of experience in the banking industry depreciates over time as the constantly changing environment renders old experience less useful. Because there is often no theoretical basis on which to predict a priori the specific functional form of the decay of experience (Argote, 1999) , prior learning researchers have often employed a prespecified functional form of experience decay before estimating models (e.g., Darr et al., 1995; Ingram & Baum, 1997a) . Following this tradition, we discounted experience using age, the most commonly used functional form of experience decay (e.g., Baum & Ingram, 1998) . We also estimated models using experience variables that were not discounted to examine the robustness of the models and the sensitivity of the measures. This analysis also afforded an opportunity to investigate how different discounting assumptions influenced the estimation of learning outcomes. We obtained consistent results from these two different discounting approaches.
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Industry bank near-failure experience. We measured near-failures using the CAMEL rating, a composite index that assesses a financial institution's health on five important dimensions: capital risk, asset quality, management, earnings, and leverage. CAMEL ratings range from 1 (the lowest) to 300 (the highest). Ratings between 125 and 164 are considered to be average, and a bank whose rating is below 125 is considered to be under financial strain and at risk of failure. Banks rated below average (0 -125) are characterized by high average loan delinquency, excess nonperforming assets (assets that do not accrue interest income owing to delinquency or other problems), and negligible financial leverage owing to narrow leverage spreads. A healthy bank without a major problem might experience a deterioration of its CAMEL rating for a short time as a result of unexpected, one-time transactions-such as writing off a large delinquent loan account-but such a temporary drop is usually corrected within one or two reporting periods (i.e., quarters). Properly managed banks also have layers of protective mechanisms (such as loss provisions) that can be used to improve their ratings in a relatively short time period. Further, banks put considerable effort into maintaining their CAMEL ratings. Banks with low ratings are subject to higher interest rates for borrowing capital, higher levels of regulatory intervention, and lower customer confidence, all of which can add substantial costs to their operation. Hence, receiving below-average CAMEL ratings for more than two consecutive quarters generally signals that banks face a serious threat of not recovering from their bad ratings because of poor management or persistent financial problems.
On the basis of the banking literature (e.g., Cole & Gunther, 1998; Gunther & Moore, 2000) and our qualitative evidence, we defined a near-failure as occurring when a bank received a below-average CAMEL rating for at least two consecutive quarters and then recovered from its low ratings. This measure offered the advantage of being a single, quasiobjective metric on which each bank could be placed. A total of 14,939 (or an average of 995.93 per year) near-failure events were recorded during the study period.
Industry bank in-state near-failure experience for bank i at time t was operationalized as the discounted sum of the total number of all banks that experienced near-failure in bank i's state between its founding and the year before the bank was at the risk of failure (t -1): ϭ tF tϪ1 total number of near-failures SJ, t age of experience , where t F is the year when bank i was founded, total number of near-failures Sj, t represents the total number of near-failures in state S j in which bank i is located in year t, and age of experience is the discount factor. Similarly, industry bank out-of-state near-failure experience for bank i at time t was the discounted sum of the total number of all banks that experienced near-failure in the entire U.S. banking industry, excluding the state in which bank i was located, operationalized as:
total number of near-failures t Ϫ total number of near-failures Sj, t age of experience , where total number of near-failures t represents the total number of near-failures in the entire U.S. commercial banking industry in year t. Industry bank failure experience. Industry bank in-state failure experience for bank i at time t was defined as the discounted sum of the total 7 We report only the results of the models using the age-discounted experience variables for the sake of parsimonious presentation of our findings. The results based on the nondiscounted experience variables are available from the first author upon request.
number of bank failures that had occurred in bank i's state since the bank's founding and until the year before the bank was at risk of failure. Industry bank out-of-state failure experience was similarly measured as the discounted sum of the total number of bank failures in the entire U.S. banking industry, excluding the state in which the focal bank was located. A total of 1,651 (or an average of 110 per year) bank failures occurred during the study period.
We created a set of failure and near-failure experience variables for thrifts using the same method described above for banks. A total of 3,358 (an average of 223.87 per year) thrift near-failures and 1,209 (an average of 80.6 per year) thrift failures were recorded during the study period. Because learning from failure-related experience is not likely to occur instantaneously, all independent variables were taken from the year before a bank was at risk of failure (t -1).
Control Variables
Controls for alternative arguments. Most prior empirical studies in the organizational learning tradition have examined how various sources of learning (e.g., experience or performance feedback) either influence performance outcomes (e.g., Ingram & Baum, 1997a) or result in changes in firm behavior (e.g., Greve, 1998) rather than directly measuring what is learned. Similarly, we sought to establish a causal relationship between experience and an important learning outcome (i.e., firm failure) without directly examining intermediate learning processes. Although failure was an appropriate measure of learning outcomes in our study context, it was still removed from learning processes and changes in actual practices and routines derived from learning. Thus, we included an extensive set of control variables, to systematically address alternative interpretations-such as changes in the level of competition in the industry-by which industry failure might enhance later viability, and to extract compounded learning effects.
Studies with other theoretical frameworks provide empirical evidence consistent with the implications of failure-based learning, although they may offer other causal models for the evidence. In particular, studies in the organizational ecology tradition have reported that prior failures of firms enhanced the viability of other, remaining firms (Aldrich, Zimmer, Staber, & Beggs, 1994; Carroll & Hannan, 1989) . These studies have typically attributed the positive impact of prior failure to increased resource availability or to decreased competition. Although the failures of a small number of banks might not release resources significant enough to change the survival odds of large national banks, these failures might have freed up a significant amount of resources for the new and often small regional banks that made up a large portion of our study cohort. Thus, we controlled for the potential impact of two important resources that can be released from bank failure.
Assets are one good proxy of the business resources released by a failed bank because the assets of banks closely represent the total amounts of their loans and investments, which are usually assumed by other banks if they fail. We measured bank asset release as the total amount of assets of failed banks at the times of their failures during a given year and included it in the baseline model to control for increased business resources resulting from bank failures. Thrift assets release was created to account for resources released by thrift failures. We also added bank employee release, measured as the total number of bank employees of failed banks at the times of failures during a given year, to the model to account for the increased availability of managerial resources owing to the failures. Because our informants suggested that the released resources were generally absorbed locally, these variables were aggregated at the state level.
The amount of industry failure and near-failure experience could be a proxy for economic conditions and might influence failure rates of banks through economic processes in addition to vicarious learning processes. For example, a high level of industry failure experience might reflect deteriorating banking environments, and a high level of industry near-failure experience could indicate improving market conditions. We added a set of four control variables to account for these potential effects. The number of current-year bank failures was the total number of bank failures occurring in a focal bank's state in current year t, and the number of current-year bank near-failures was the total number of bank near-failures experienced by all banks in the focal bank's state in current year t. The number of current-year thrift failures and the number of current-year thrift near-failures were similarly created.
Population-level density controls. The number of firms in a market may affect the survival chances of firms in that market by influencing the level of competition and legitimacy (Hannan & Carroll, 1992; Hannan & Freeman, 1989) . To err on the side of caution, we included bank density and bank density squared as control variables, aggregating bank density to the state level to accurately account for the effect of state regulations as well as for competition. Densities and square densities of thrifts and credit unions were also added to account for competition between these populations. Founding bank density, founding thrift density, and founding credit union density were included in the baseline model to account for potential effects of environmental conditions on a bank at the time of its founding (Hannan & Freeman, 1989) .
Congenital experience. Congenital experience refers to experience that has already accrued within an industry before a focal firm is founded. New firms are often built upon practices and rules defined by the prevailing logic and norms in their initial environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) . What a firm knows at its birth can affect how it interprets future events, and thus the congenital experience available to a new firm can also influence its future learning outcomes (Huber, 1991) . New firms can access congenital experience through various repositories, such as industry reports, journals, conferences, and individual carriers, including employees, consultants, and regulators. Two variables, congenital industry operating experience and congenital industry failure experience, controlled for these effects (e.g., Ingram & Baum, 1997a) . Congenital industry operating experience reflected the collection of knowledge related to various aspects of key operations that individual firms in an industry have accumulated since its advent. Loans are the most important source of revenue and profit for most commercial banks and are closely linked to other key banking activities. Hence, the total amount of loans that banks have made directly approximates their operating experience. Congenital industry operating experience was measured as the total amount of loans made by all banks since 1934 (the advent year of the FDIC) to the year before a focal bank was chartered. Congenital industry failure experience was measured as the total number of bank failures from 1934 until the year before the focal bank was chartered. We did not control for congenital industry near-failure experience because the CAMEL rating data were not available prior to the study period. We discounted both congenital experience variables using the age of experience.
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Own near-failures. Obviously, a bank cannot learn from its own failure, but its own near-failure may offer survival-enhancing learning opportunities. We measured a focal bank's own near-failures as the discounted (by the age of each event) sum of the number of near-failure events that the bank had experienced between its founding and the year before the bank was at risk of failure.
Socioeconomic conditions. The combination of macroeconomics and the social environment affects the level of bank failure (DeYoung, 2000) . We added the unemployment rate, personal income, the bank prime loan rate, and the Dow Jones Industrial Index to control for the effects of general economic condition. The banking literature has often cited risky commercial real estate investment as one of the most important reasons for the massive bank failures during our study period (Freund, Curry, Hirsch, & Kelly, 1997) . The National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries Index (the NCREIF Index), the most frequently used measure of real estate market performance, was included as a control for the influence of the real estate market cycle and fluctuation during the study period. We measured all of these variables except for the prime loan rate and Dow Jones Industrial Index at the state level to accurately reflect the market condition of each bank in the sample. We also included year dummy variables to account for socioeconomic conditions not captured by other control variables. The banking industry experienced an industrywide crisis during a substantial part of our study period, which may have influenced bank failure rates through economic and regulatory contagion. The year dummies also controlled for the period effects of the banking industry crisis.
Organization-level controls. The primary purpose of these variables was to control for potential heterogeneity among banks in the sample. We included bank size, measured as the logarithm of the total assets of a focal bank, and charter type ("federally chartered" ϭ 1, "state chartered" ϭ 0). Because the financial health of individual banks has a direct bearing on their survival, it needed to be controlled for. The CAMEL rating was a prime candidate for this role since it captures the soundness of financial institutions, but one of the five components of the CAMEL rating, management, partially captures the same effects of organizational learning that we intended to tease out from the data. Thus, instead of using the full CAMEL rating, we included only four of its components, excluding management: the capital asset ratio, measured as the ratio of equity capital to total assets and included to control for capital requirements; the nonperforming asset ratio, measured as the ratio of nonperforming assets to total assets and included to control for asset quality; return on assets, measured as net income divided by average quarterly assets and added to account for earnings; and financial leverage, the percent change in earnings available to common stockholders associated with a given percent change in earnings before interest and taxes, which we added to reflect the amount of debt used in the capital structure of a bank. All organization-level control variables were measured at the end of the quarter prior to the current quarter when a focal bank was at risk of failure (t -1).
Analysis
We used survival analysis to estimate the unobserved hazard rate of bank failure. This method uses all the information provided by right-censored cases and avoids the biases that would be created with the use of logistic regression and similar methods on right-censored data (Allison, 1984; Yamaguchi, 1991) . It was important to obtain unbiased failure rate estimates because approximately 58 percent of the banks in the study sample (1,560/2,696 total banks in the sample) were right-censored.
Parametric estimates of a hazard rate require assumptions about the effect of time on the occurrence of the events of interest, and selecting an appropriate functional specification for duration dependence is crucial for accurate parameter estimation. We used a piecewise exponential model that split the time axis into predefined time segments and permitted the hazard rate to vary in an unconstrained way between time periods (Blossfeld & Rohwer, 1995) .
Our preliminary data investigation revealed three separate time intervals that showed relatively distinctive failure rates (corresponding to approximately the fourth and ninth years after founding: 0 -4, 5-8, and Ͼ 9). Consistently with this, our industry study indicated that newly chartered banks are typically protected by regulatory agencies for the first three to five years (DeVaughn & Kim, 2006) . Hence, the piecewise exponential model proved an appropriate choice for our sample. We also estimated our models using three other parametric specifications that are commonly used in organization research (i.e., the exponential, Gompertz, and Weibull specifications) and obtained consistent results, demonstrating that our results were not sensitive to the choice of parametric specification. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and a bivariate correlation matrix for all study variables. The bivariate correlation coefficients among some experience variables are in the moderate to high range. As one would expect, the correlations among the density control variables of the three populations are high. These variables have been shown by a number of prior studies in the organizational ecology tradition (see Baum, 1996) to significantly affect failure rates. Model builders can omit variables to avoid potential consequences of multicollinear- ity, but the omission of the variables proven to influence the phenomenon being studied will introduce a specification error by affecting the values of the parameters of the remaining variables (Greene, 2003) . The specification error is a more serious matter from the modeling perspective than multicollinearity, the exact consequences of which are yet to be theoretically established for maximum-likelihood estimation methods such as the event history analysis we used in this study (Kennedy, 1992) . Multicollinearity among variables often inflates standard errors and consequently parameter estimates are less efficient, but it does not bias parameter estimation (Cohen & Cohen, 1983) . Accordingly, we included variables that mattered theoretically (Schwab, 1999) .
RESULTS
Bivariate Correlations
To identify potential model estimation issues, we estimated the models by adding the variables individually and examined the existence of any instability in coefficients that was not theoretically justifiable (e.g., sign changes without potential suppressor effects). The results showed little evidence of coefficient instability, suggesting that the multicollinearity did not introduce material modeling problems. We also calculated variance inflation factors (VIFs) of the experience variables and found that they were around or below 10, the common rule of thumb (average VIF ϭ 6.9). Our models also yielded consistent results over different model specifications (e.g., different parametric assumptions) and different variable discount rates, suggesting that multicollinearity did not cause material disturbances in our models. Table 2 reports maximum-likelihood estimates using a piecewise exponential model of effects for U.S. commercial banks chartered since 1984. Significance tests are two-tailed for all variables. The baseline model contains all control variables. Model 1 adds the industry-level experience variables for banks, and model 2 adds the industrylevel experience variables for thrifts. Model 3 includes industry-level experience variables for both banks and thrifts, with the latter added hierarchically. The log-likelihood ratio tests show that the addition of each predictor variable block significantly improved the model fit.
Hypothesis Testing
Near-failure experience of banks and thrifts. Hypothesis 1, which predicts survival-enhancing learning from the in-state and out-of-state near-failure experience of banks, was partially supported. The coefficients for industry bank in-state nearfailure experience were negative and statistically significant in both models 1 and 3. This finding indicates that the near-failures of other banks in the same state reduced bank failure rates. However, the coefficients for industry bank out-of-state near-failure experience were not statistically significant.
Hypothesis 2, which proposes survival-enhancing learning from the in-state and out-of-state nearfailure experience of thrifts, was also partially supported. The coefficients for industry thrift in-state near-failure experience were negative and statistically significant in both models 2 and 3, but the coefficients for industry thrift out-of-state near-failure experience were not statistically significant.
Failure experience of banks and thrifts. Our results provided partial support for Hypothesis 3, which predicts survival-enhancing learning from the in-state and out-of-state failure experience of banks. The coefficients for industry bank in-state failure experience were negative and statistically significant in both models 1 and 3, but the coefficients for industry bank out-of-state failure experience were not statistically significant.
Results also partially supported the prediction that thrift failure levels would decrease bank failure rates (Hypothesis 4). Industry thrift in-state failure experience was negative and significant for both models 2 and 3, indicating that thrift failure experience in the focal bank's state reduced bank failure rates. The industry thrift out-of-state failure experience coefficient was not statistically significant.
In-state versus out-of-state experience. Hypotheses 5a-5d compare in-state and out-of-state experience and predict that in-state experience has stronger survival-enhancing learning effects for all types of experience. The results provided consistent conceptual support for the expectation that in-state experience has stronger survival learning effects than out-of-state experience. All of the coefficients for the in-state experience variables were negative and statistically significant, but none of the coefficients for the out-of-state experience variables were statistically significant. To statistically assess the relative magnitudes of the in-state and out-of-state experience variables' coefficients, we estimated the models with standardized variables and performed incremental chi-square tests for equality of coefficients between the unconstrained model and the model that constrained the coefficients of in-state and out-of-state experience to be the same (Greene, 2003) .
hancing effects of in-state and out-of-state industrylevel experience of banks. The standardized coefficients of industry bank in-state near-failure experience (-1.36 for model 1; -1.19 for model 3) were negative, and those for the parallel out-ofstate variable were positive (0.44 for model 1; 0.72 for model 3), and the incremental chi-square test showed that the coefficients of the two variables were not equal in both model 1 ( 2 ϭ 23.82, p Ͻ .01) and model 3 ( 2 ϭ 17.45, p Ͻ .01). These results support Hypothesis 5a's statement that in-state near-failure experience has stronger survival-enhancing effects than out-of-state near-failure experience. The standardized coefficients of industry bank in-state failure experience (-0.31 for model 1; -0.32 for model 3) were negative, and the standardized coefficients of bank out-of-state failure experience (0.25 for model 1; 0.92 for model 3) were positive; these two coefficients were not equal in both model 1 ( 2 ϭ 5.33, p Ͻ .05) and model 3 ( 2 ϭ 7.78, p Ͻ .01). These results support Hypothesis 5b's prediction that in-state failure experience has greater survival-enhancing effects than out-of-state failure experience.
Hypotheses 5c and 5d contrast the impact of the industry-level in-state and out-of-state failure experience of thrifts. Thrift in-state near-failure experience (␤ ϭ -0.53 for model 2; -0.58 for model 3) had a stronger effect than thrift out-of-state near-failure experience (␤ ϭ 0.12 for model 2; -.20 for model 3); the chi-square statistic ( 2 ϭ 7.57, p Ͻ .01 for model 2; 8.18, p Ͻ .01 for model 3) indicated that these two coefficients were not equal, supporting the prediction that thrift in-state near-failure experience has greater survival-enhancing effects than thrift out-of-state near-failure experience (Hypothesis 5c). When we compared the impact of the industrylevel in-state and out-of-state failure experience of thrifts, models 2 and 3 provided mixed support for Hypothesis 5d. In model 2, the standardized coefficient of thrift in-state failure experience (-0.34) was negative, and the standardized coefficient of thrift out-of-state failure experience (0.11) was positive, and the incremental chi-square test showed that these coefficients were not equal ( 2 ϭ 9.10, p Ͻ .01). However, the chi-square statistic ( 2 ϭ 1.08) was not statistically significant in model 3, implying that the in-and out-of-state variables' effects on bank failure rates were not significantly different. In sum, our findings primarily supported the prediction that in-state experience is a more effective source of survival-enhancing learning than out-of-state experience.
Near-failure, failure, and industry origin. Hypothesis 6a predicts stronger survival-enhancing learning effects from near-failure experience than from failure experience when learning occurs within the banking industry. We estimated the full model with standardized variables and performed incremental chi-square tests for equality of coefficients between the unconstrained model and the model constraining the coefficients of near-failure experience and failure experience to be the same. Because none of the nonlocal experience variables had statistically significant effects, the comparison was made only between local near-failure and failure experience. The results indicated that industrylevel bank in-state near-failure experience (␤ ϭ -1.19) had a stronger effect on bank failure rates than industry-level bank in-state failure experience (␤ ϭ -0.32) and that the coefficients of the two variables were not equal ( 2 ϭ 7.30, p Ͻ .01), providing strong support for Hypothesis 6a.
Hypothesis 6b makes the opposite prediction concerning the impact of failure and near-failure in the case of interpopulation survival-enhancing learning; we anticipated that thrift failure experience would have a more powerful impact than thrift near-failure experience. However, contrary to our prediction, the impacts of industry-level thrift in-state near-failure experience (␤ ϭ -0.58) and thrift in-state failure experience (␤ ϭ -0.26) on bank failure rates were not statistically different, since the incremental chi-square test did not permit rejection of the null hypothesis that the coefficients of these two variables were equal ( 2 ϭ 1.98). In sum, these results imply that near-failure experience has stronger survival-enhancing learning effects for within-industry learning but that the coefficients for near-failure and failure do not differ at a statistically significant level for across-industry learning.
Baseline model. Although not our theoretical focus, control variables revealed results generally consistent with our expectations and with prior related research. Bank size decreased the chances of failure, a finding consistent with "liability of smallness" arguments (Delacroix & Swaminathan, 1991; Levinthal, 1991) . A curvilinear effect for bank density was observed despite the fact that only a partial history was examined and the industry was mature. The discontinuity created by changes in the regulatory environment and dynamics in the 1980s may have reset the industry clock. Two CAMEL rating components, nonperforming asset ratio and return on assets, affected bank failure rates as predicted. Several measures of economic ity of coefficients such as a t-test or a Wald test (Greene, 2003) .
munificence influenced bank failure rates (the unemployment rate, personal income, and the bank prime loan rate). Finally, congenital industry failure experience decreased bank failure rates, suggesting that the banks in our study sample benefited from their congenital experience. These findings contrasts with those of Ingram and Baum (1997a) , who found congenital industry failure experience had no statistically significant impact in the context of U.S. hotel chains. This disparity may be related to differences in study period, industry type, or measurement strategies.
DISCUSSION
Contemporary advice to managers often urges organizations to invest considerable resources in finding and following best practices revealed through the experience of others. Early scholarly work on vicarious learning focused on simple imitation, using success proxies such as organization size, and progressed to studies of learning from successful outcomes (Conell & Cohn, 1995; Haunschild & Miner, 1997) . Recent work has begun to tackle the more complex possibilities of learning from variation and even from failure (Baum et al., 2000; Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Kim, 2000; Miner et al., 1999) , but puzzles remain.
Our results offer three important insights for this emerging stream of research on learning from failure-related experience. First, both industry nearfailure and failure experience accrued since a firm's birth can produce vicarious learning for the firm, with each type of failure experience offering distinctive value. Second, failure-related experience occurring in the same geographic market as a focal firm appears to matter much more than experience outside the geographic market. Only failure experience in the same geographical market as a focal firm had statistically significant impact in our setting, a finding consistent with theories that emphasize the importance of the availability and relevance of experience. We found this outcome even during a period of increasing general communication between organizations over state and national boundaries. Third, organizations can apparently learn from failure-related experience both in their own and in a closely related population, but the relative impacts of different types of experience vary across settings, pointing to a contingency approach to the value of different types of failurerelated experience and industry context.
We first reflect, in more detail, on the patterns of our results, and note limitations of this study. We close by speculating on our results' implications for three emerging research frontiers: work on outcome-based learning; the question of whether learning can affect new firms' survival, above and beyond legitimacy or competition; and the impact of population-level experience.
Overall Results
Types of industry failure experience. Our overall results are consistent with our expectations about both vicarious learning from failure and nearfailure experience and the importance of the origins of experience for survival-enhancing learning, even as the results point to promising areas for further work. Our informants reported that banks actively try to learn from both the near-failures and failures of others, noting distinctive features of each type of experience. Historical industry studies provided detailed descriptions of various channels for learning from both types of failure experience in both banks and thrifts, including broadcast processes-such as publications, consultants, informal contacts, and professional conferences-and more focused contact processes-such as interactions with other bankers at meetings and social events, or with regulators (FDIC, 1998) . Qualitative evidence in industry reports and interviews also described many types of learning content: bankers reported not only learning specific practices and strategies, but also getting ideas about capabilities to develop, activities to avoid, and ways to innovate. Our systematic data analysis on the impact of both failure and near-failure supported the prediction that these activities increased the survival chances of the banks in the sample. Although a success bias may pervade normative management theory and much prior scholarly work (Finkelstein, 2003; McGrath, 1999) , both our qualitative and quantitative findings indicate learning from failure-related experience can occur.
To our knowledge, this is the first study providing systematic empirical evidence on learning from near-failure, an important variation of failure-related experience. Our findings support arguments for the value of fine-grained knowledge revealed in or triggered by near-failure, which provides a library of possible solutions as well as data that an observing firm can use to develop its own models for generating new behavior. Near-failures embody de facto mini pre-post experiments, whose value has long been discussed in basic theories of inferential learning (Kim, 2000) . Supporting the potential value of near-failure experience, we found that the industry-level near-failure experience of banks generated stronger survival-enhancing learning than did their industry-level failure experience.
Same versus different geographic market experience. The pattern for the geographical location of experience-captured here as in-state versus out-of-state experience-strongly supports the value of same-market experience in our research setting. We proposed that events that occurred in the same geographic market a focal bank occupied should be both more accessible and more applicable (Greve, 1999) and hence should offer more learning value. In keeping with our arguments, the industry-level in-state failure and near-failure experience of other banks and of thrifts all increased the survival prospects of banks in our sample. In no case did out-of-state experience produce survivalenhancing learning in our models. Qualitative evidence revealed many communication sources within geographical areas, in part through social networks. Our findings are especially interesting given the increasing presence of objective information exchange among organizations, which might be expected to erode the importance of local connections. Local social interaction may have permitted the transmission of complex knowledge or development of capabilities and insights not easily transmitted through formal information exchange (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996) . Deeper understanding of the robust value of local experience seems a worthy goal, given contemporary emphases on shared knowledge and the standardization of many industries.
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Interpopulation experience. The results clearly showed that banks could indeed learn from failurerelated experience in the thrift industry (that is, from experience outside their own industry). This finding represents another empirical advance in research on vicarious organizational learning. We predicted that the relative impact of a type of failure experience would depend on whether it occurred in the home or a distant industry segment. We theorized that it is harder for banks to become aware of near-failure events in the thrift industry and that thrifts' failures would have a greater impact than their near-failures. However, there was no statistically significant difference in the impacts of failure and near-failure in thrifts.
Without overinterpreting this result, we speculate that other organizational processes or factors might influence the effectiveness of vicarious interpopulation learning from failure-related experience or might influence survival through processes other than learning. For example, failures in thrifts could reduce the legitimacy of that industry, helping the life chances of firms in competing populations, including banks. Indeed, at the peak of the S&L crisis during the late 1980s, a large number of S&L failures lowered customer confidence in those institutions and led many of their customers to migrate to alternative financial service institutions, such as credit unions and banks, which caused deposit shortages in many S&Ls and consequently undermined their viability (FDIC, 1997) . Legitimacy differences cannot explain the main body of our findings, since failure-related bank experiences have value for banks. Probing cross-industry visibility versus legitimacy processes in interpopulation learning offers an interesting frontier for further work and underscores the importance of different perceptions of the meaning of failure (Suchman, 1995) .
Finally, when compared in detail to closely related prior empirical work, this study fills several specific gaps (Ingram, 2002) . Chuang and Baum's (2003) study of nursing homes showed that organizations could learn vicariously from the failures of others, but they did not explore different types of failure-related experience (i.e., near-failure), nor did they contrast intrapopulation and interpopulation learning. Miner and colleagues (1999) described several processes associated with vicarious learning from others' failures but did not provide systematic evidence that such learning efforts actually produced valuable learning outcomes. Haunschild and colleagues reported evidence of learning from negative organizational events, such as airline accidents and car recalls (Haunschild & Rhee, 2004; Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002) , but they did not compare the relative impacts of different types of failure-related experience. Combined, our findings imply a contingency framework for vicarious learning from different modes and locations of others' failures and near-failures and suggest factors such as the visibility, accessibility, and applicability of others' experience as important determinants for the contingent factors.
Limitations and Extensions
Failure and near-failure in the banking industry can be measured with some objectivity, and the industry has multiple layers of strong communication channels. Chuang and Baum's (2003) evidence of learning from failure by nursing home chains also occurred in a setting with reasonably clear failure outcomes and communication paths. Further work should examine industries in which it may be harder to assess both failure and near-failure as we have defined it, and in which there are different combinations of communication links. Such work would test the generalizability of our findings and help to distinguish learning blocks and facilitators.
Although we move the literature forward by studying two types of relatedness dimensions that could affect learning outcomes (that is, same versus different geographic market, and intrapopulation versus interpopulation effects), many other key potential dimensions exist. For example, the experience of established firms and young firms might produce different learning outcomes because the experience of established firms might be less relevant to young firms, and vice versa.
In this article, we compare the relative impacts of failure and near-failure experience, but we did not explore how the two forms of experience interact with each other (Haleblian, Kim, & Rajagopalan, 2006) . For example, because failure is more visible than near-failure, it is possible that organizations turn to near-failure experience only after failure experience grabs their attention (Rerup, 2002) . Exploring the interaction of different types of failurerelated experience (or the interaction of failurerelated experience with other types of experience) could be fruitful.
11 Other important extensions would include assessing how firms' internal experience and industry-level experience influence each other.
We chose to study new banks because (1) the quarterly performance data needed to measure near-failures were not available before 1984 and (2) the potential for vicarious learning is especially important for new banks that-by definition-have relatively less of their own experience to build on. Our hypotheses emphasized general learning processes because we believed the causal learning processes were generic. Further work could fruitfully explore whether more subtle patterns emerge over time.
Finally, we adopted failure as a dependent variable because our theoretical framework was survival-enhancing learning. However, failure-like other frequently used measures of learning outcomes (e.g., operating performance or productivity)-does not directly capture the learning processes or lessons learned from all failure-related experiences. Future work should also probe intermediate learning outcomes of observing banks, including financial performance and business practice changes.
Implications
The study's findings raise questions for topics beyond work on vicarious learning from failure. Given the fact that our data concern a cohort of young firms, our empirical findings may offer useful insights to emerging research on entrepreneurial learning by adding systematic evidence that vicarious learning from failure-related experience occurs among young firms (Ireland, Reutzel, & Webb, 2005) . Early ecological models suggested that legitimacy and competition, as captured by measures of population density, drove the fate of new firms (Hannan & Carroll, 1992) . The pattern of our findings implies that the survival chances of new firms can depend on vicarious learning as well. Our results support growing evidence that, in settings where these new firms can meaningfully adjust their strategies and implement new practices, start-ups can learn from the real-time experiences of others (Aldrich, 1999) . Young banks do not have fixed fates based only on industry starting conditions or ongoing density conditions but appear to gain knowledge and capabilities in real time after their birth, partially through observing the near-failures and failures of others. This observation is consistent with the work on organizational entrepreneurial learning (Gong, Baker, & Miner, 2005; Ireland et al., 2005) emphasizing that new firms learn from both vicarious and direct experience.
Learning from other organizations' near-failures and failures represents a special case of what Haunschild and Miner (1997) defined as outcome imitation or learning. In this learning mode, the observed outcomes of an action, rather than proxies, drive learning. Our informants described "behavioral" outcome learning in which they tried to replicate actions with good results or avoid actions with bad outcomes. They also described more complex cognitive processes in which they created mental models that could lead to new strategies, practices, or even innovation. Future work could fruitfully probe which of these different forms of outcome learning drove our findings.
Finally, we note that the individual failures that made up the industry experience represented negative situations from most observers' viewpoints. Yet, aggregated into industry experience, the same bad outcomes had potentially positive learning value for others. March (1991) observed that an important social phenomenon occurs when an event that represents danger or even disaster at a lower level of a system-here, firm failure-plays a valuable role for adaptation by the system as a whole. Our theory and evidence suggest that indi-vidual organizations can learn from industry-level experience. This idea raises but leaves unresolved the question of whether any higher-level adaptation or population-level learning also sprang from the ongoing failure-related experience. Continuing work on possible industry-level effects, in addition to the organizational impact we study here, offers a fertile domain for probing the impact of learning at different levels of organizational systems, an important frontier for richer models of organizational learning.
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